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THE TROUBLE WITH MERCURY:
CAN DOMESTIC LAWS CONTAIN AN
INTERNATIONAL THREAT?
"Quicksilver," a nickname connoting life-like mobility, well befits
mercury. Indeed, the name derives from the fact that mercury is the
only metal existing in the liquid state at ordinary temperatures. It is
also more abundant, more volatile, and more reactive than other metals
it most resembles chemically. These, and a host of other unusual prop-
erties, have led to widespread industrial use of mercury and its com-
pounds. However, as much as one-quarter of this mercury, some 600 tons
annually in the United States alone, is being returned to the environ-
ment.' Between 1953 and 1970, the threat of mercury pollution be-
came evident, but not until almost 1971 did anyone suspect the prob-
lem was other than local in nature.
I
BACKGROUND
It was in 1953 that symptoms of chronic and acute mercury poisoning
were first observed in villages surrounding Minimata Bay in Japan.
Villagers who had eaten fish and shellfish caught in Minimata Bay
suffered from progressive blindness, deafness, incoordination, and intel-
lectual deterioration2 - symptoms which had for years plagued industrial
workers using mercury.3 Through 1970, 121 cases of "Minimata disease"
1. See 713 GEOLOGICAL SURVEY PROFESSIONAL PAPER, REPORT ON MERCURY IN THE
ENVIRONMtENT, at 4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Mercury in the Environment].
2. ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARC H, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 1971, at 5. See also Irukayama,
The Pollution of Minimata Bay and Minimata Disease, ADVANCES IN WATER POLLUTION
RESEARCH, Proceedings of the Third International Conference, Vol. 3, September
1966, at 153-65.
3. Mercury has long been known as a poison. The old expression 'mad as
a hatter' reflected popular awareness of brain damage sometimes suffered
by hatmakers working with felt that had been processed with mercury. Yet
until recently neither Government officials nor scientists gave much thought
to the possible harmful effects of mercury-containing wastes dumped into
sewer systems by industrial plants. There was evidently a widespread assump-
tion that mercury was insoluble and would lie forever quietly and inertly
at the bottom of any body of water it reached.
N.Y. Times, July 25, 1970, at 22, col. 2. For a detailed treatment of industrial cases of
mercury poisoning, see P. Bws'TRuP, Toxicrry OF MERCURY AND ITs CoMPOuNDs (1964).
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were diagnosed including forty-six deaths. Twenty-three cases were
congenitally defective babies suffering a cerebral palsy-like disease and
born to mothers who had eaten contaminated fish but showed no symp-
toms themselves.
The source of contamination was eventually traced to a plastics manu-
facturing plant upstream from Minimata Bay which discharged large
amounts of methymercury, a particularly dangerous organic form of the
metal. By a process of biological magnification only incompletely under-
stood, methylmercury is quickly assimilated by plants and lower marine
life and progressively concentrated as it moves up the food chain.4 The
incidents at Minimata Bay made mercury the only substance which, as
a pollutant, has directly taken human life.5
New evidence from Sweden indicated that certain microbial systems
in the bottom muds of rivers and bays were capable of converting in-
organic mercury residues, long thought to be inert, into active and
dangerous methylmercury. "Thus, the hazard to man was associated
with his eating fish and shellfish and not simply with the presence of
methylmercury in the [waste] water." 6 These discoveries prompted the
Scandinavian countries in 1966 to curtail their previously heavy use of
mercury pesticides.
It was not until March of 1970, however, that the United States be-
came interested in mercury pollution. After a Canadian graduate student
found high levels of mercury in fish caught in Lake St. Clair, the province
of Ontario promptly banned commercial and sport fishing on the
Canadian side of the popular lake. Michigan then banned fishing on
the United States' portion of Lake St. Clair, and subsequent discoveries
and responses throughout the United States followed rapidly.7
4. Biological magnification of a pollutant occurs each time one organism consumes
quantities of a lesser organism which is already contaminated. Smaller fish eat
plants that have absorbed mercury from the surrounding water. Predatory fish feed
on the smaller animals, thus carrying the process one step further. Man is often
the end-point in this sequence.
5. It is, of course, recognized that many pollutants have caused death. Rachel Car-
son, in SILENT SPRING (1962), described the terrible deaths suffered by farm workers
exposed to pesticides. However, in these cases, just as in instances of industrial
mercury poisoning, death resulted from direct contact with the chemical and not
through the complex physical and biological processes of "pollution."
6. ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 2, at 5.
7. Ohio banned fishing on its portion of Lake Erie and filed suit against Dow
and Wyandotte chemical companies seeking injunctive relief and damages for their
pollution of the lake through operation of their mercury cell chlorine-alkali plants.
See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), where the Supreme
Court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction because of the complexity of the
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By Fall, 1970, mercury pollution was established as a nationwide prob-
lem. Water, fish, and gamebirds in at least thirty-three states were found
to contain abnormally high amounts of mercury.8 Still, the extent of
the threat was not fully known. A preview of what was to come was a
New York Times report on the discovery of mercury in the livers of
Pacific seals 100 times the level established as safe for human con-
sumption." The climax came in December. Tuna and swordfish were
withdrawn from the market within a few days of each other by the
Food and Drug Administration due to unsafe mercury levels.' 0 Tuna
and swordfish are deep sea fishes which, unlike many marine species,
have no contact with fresh or brackish water. Mercury pollution had
reached the oceans and become an international threat."
II
DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
Mercury and the entire class of pollutants known as "heavy metals"'1
factual issues involved. By May, New York had banned fishing in Onondaga Lake,
the Oswego River, Niagara River, Lake Erie, and Lake Ontario. The following
summer found widely-scattered states like Vermont and Georgia restricting local
fishing. The Justice Department began to institute civil actions to enjoin industrial
discharge of mercury into navigable waters under authority of a newly-resurrected
weapon, Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. See note 45 infra. For a
comprehensive chronology of the events occuring between March 1970 and February
1971, see H. JONES, MERCURY POLLUTION CONTROL, at 3-12 (1971).
8. N. Y. Times, September 11, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
9. N. Y. Times, October 30, 1970, at 1, col. 7. The Food and Drug Administration
responded by banning further interstate distribution of a particular vitamin capsule
made primarily from seal liver. Id. at col. 8. The discovery also provoked concern
for Alaskan Eskimos, many of whom still rely on seals and other marine mammals
as a staple part of their diets. Id. at cols. 6-7.
10. MaRCURy POLLUTION CONTROL, supra note 7, at 12.
11. The North Pacific halibut is the latest species added to a growing list of fish
found to contain mercury and undergoing Food and Drug Administration inspec-
tions before going to market. Washington Post, August 4, 1971, at A-23, col. 4.
12. The class of heavy metal pollutants includes silver, arsenic, cadmium, chromi-
um, copper, mercury, lead, nickel, and zinc. See FED. WATER POLL. CONTROL AD.,
REPORT ON WATER QUALITY CRITERIA, at 85-88 (April 1968). Mercury, however, is
considered the most toxic member of the group. Id. at 85, 88. See also Statement of
the Honorable Carl L. Klein, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Water Quality
and Research, before the Subcommittee on Energy, Natural Resources and Environ-
ment, Senate Committee on Commerce, August 26, 1970 for a report on the toxic
threat of arsenic, cadmium, and lead in our waterways. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY, Toxic SUrSTANCES, at 2 (April 1970) [hereinafter cited as
Toxic SUBSTANCES] for estimates of United States consumption of these toxic metals.
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were largely overshadowed by oil and pesticides during the 1960's.13
Dramatic catastrophes like Torrey Canyon and Santa Barbara vaulted
oil into the top spot as a marine pollutant. 14 How does mercury compare
with these rivals for the public eye?' 5 By each of the four criteria pro-
posed by the Council on Environmental Quality as guidelines to environ-
mental priorities,16 mercury and the heavy metals demand precedence.
A. The Intrinsic Importance of the Problems -The Harm Caused by
Failing to Solve Them
The effects of mercury on human beings have already been noted. At
a time when the world's population is turning increasingly to the oceans
for sources of food and protein, the contamination of marine life from
the largest fish and cetaceans to the smallest plankton singularly sug-
gests the immediacy of the mercury problem. It is contended that de-
spite evidence of mercury residues in fish for several decades,'7 incidents
of adverse effects on human life are scarce. Fortunately, incidents on the
order of Minimata Bay are rare; however, there is no way to evaluate
the cumulative and chronic effects of mercury consumption. Indeed, the
13. Small amounts of heavy metals can be a problem. For example, until early
this spring [1970], little attention was given to mercury, although separate inci-
dents of mercury poisoning had occurred in Japan and Sweden.
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: TIlE FIRST ANNUAL
REPORT, at 33 (August 1970) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY].
14. Id. at 130. The author of a recent law review note, after examining several
classification schemes, concluded:
Regardless of classification scheme and despite the difficulties of ranking
pollutants, there is general agreement that the most serious threat to the
marine environment is posed by pesticides . . . . Second place should be
given to oil ....
7 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 574, 579 (1970)
15. Choosing the most important pollutant is, regrettably, more than an academic
exercise because of the demonstrated legislative tendency to focus on problems pro-
yoking the greatest public outcry to the neglect of others. Oil pollution, admittedly
an eyesore, is already subject to a host of legislation. See Bond, The Environmental
Law Explosion-A Survey of Anti-Pollution Laws Affecting the Oil Industry, 26
Bus. LAw. 1039 (1971). Nevertheless, in his article International and National Regula-
tion of Pollution from Offshore Oil Pollution, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 541, 558 (1970),
Krueger observed:
Compared to other forms of pollution the oil spill resulting from offshore
drilling is one of the most observable and traceable, yet one of the least
permanently degrading to the environment. Compare in this regard the effect
of the discharge of hard pesticides into the ocean which result in irreversible
damage to some wildlife by means and through sources which are not readily
observable or subject to being brought to account.
16. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 13, at 237.
17. For example, excessive mercury was found in a stuffed fish preserved in New
York in 1927. MERCURY POLLUTIoN CONTROL, supra note 7, at 12.
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discovery that methylmercury crosses the placental "barrier" and
achieves a 30% higher concentration in fetal blood cells than those of
the mother' 8 has led to speculation linking mercury to many generations
of birth defects. 19
B. The Rate at Which the Problems Are Going to Increase in Magni-
tude and Intensity Over the Next Few Years
There are several types of substances for which no adequate control
authority exists and for which a total environmental approach is lacking.
Existing authority ... is not adequate to deal with such substances because
they are present not only in our air, water, and soil but in all the products
that we consume and use in our everyday lives.20
Most forms of pollution are attributable to what may be called "point-
sources." For example, oil may come from spills or leaks and pesticides
are originally produced in factories.2 1 Mercury, on the other hand, is one
of the ninety-two naturally-occurring elements, 22 and it enters the en-
vironment from many natural as well as man-made sources.23 In addi-
tion to industrial wastes, at least an equal amount of mercury comes
from the combustion of fossil fuels. 24 As a constituent of gas and smoke,
mercury drifts through the atmosphere until it is washed back to earth
by rain. Then, carried by streams and runoff, hundreds of tons of for-
merly airborne mercury are washed each year into lakes otherwise free
from pollution.25 Other frequently overlooked man-made sources of
mercury include thermometers, electrical instruments, dental prepara-
tions, paints, and pharmaceuticals 2 6
18. ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, supa note 2, at 12.
19. MERCURY POLLUTION CONTROL, supra note 7, at 12.
20. Toxic SUBSTANCES, supra note 12, at 1.
21. Existing Federal Government controls over the introduction of toxic sub-
stances into the environment are of two types. The first is control over the
initial production of a substance and its distribution. For example, . . . a
manufacturer must register a pesticide with the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) before it can be introduced in interstate commerce.
Id. at iv-v.
22. Mercury in the Environment, supra note 1, at 1.
23. Id. at 65, Table 26.
24. See ENVmRONMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 2, at 27-28, and Mercury in the En-
vironment, supra note 1, at 3-4 and Table 16 at 59. Only recently have steps been
taken to control the emission of hazardous air pollutants. See Pub. L. No. 91-604
for the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq.
25. Mercury in the Environment, supra note I, at 41. See also ENVIRONMENTAL RE-
SEARCH, supra note 2, at 51-52, for a discussion of the global transport of mercury.
26. See note 23 supra.
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Nature herself is a polluter. Industry often points out that mercury
pollution also comes from the natural leaching of ore deposits, 27 an ex-
planation for the mercury found in lakes distant from industrial opera-
tions.28 Yet even in this area, man has accelerated natural processes by
thoughtless methods of resource exploitation, such as strip mining, which
expose new areas to leaching.29
Another way that man is interfering with natural processes is by
discharging other chemicals and wastes into bodies of water. Through
the natural processes described above, a great reserve of insoluble mer-
cury compounds has been deposited at the bottom of every river and
lake.30 However, the build-up of nutrients such as phosphates and sew-
age has led to an upsurge of bacteria capable of transforming inert, in-
organic mercury sediments into the active and dangerous methylmercury.
Moreover, certain organic chemicals react with inorganic mercury there-
by increasing its mobility and toxicity.3' Therefore, "[t]he focus must
be on a particular pollutant and all the pathways by which it travels
through the ecosystem."32 (Emphasis added.)
C. The Irreversibility of the Damage if Immediate Action is Not Taken
"[S]ince there is no effective therapy for overt methylmercury poison-
ing, prevention is the means of control to be emphasized."33 In other
respects as well, mercury pollution is almost irreversible. Attention has
27. Mercury in the Environment, supra note 1, at 2. "Natural leaching" is the
process by which rain water percolating down through rocks and earth tends to
dissolve and carry away soluble materials.
28. For example, in December 1970, fish taken from Lake George, New York were
declared unfit to eat because of mercury although there are no known industrial dis-
charges of mercury into the lake. Natural sources of mercury were suspected. See
MERCURY POLLUTION CONTROL, supra note 7, at 12.
29. The newly-emerging field of deep sea mining threatens to open a Pandora's
Box of toxic substances into the oceans. The sea beds contain large amounts of
mercury which could be exposed to direct leaching if safeguards are not imposed. See
Mercury in the Environment, supra note 1, at 57, Table 12. The United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly welcomed and adopted unanimously (119-0) a resolution to deal with
pollution which could be caused by exploitation and exploration of the ocean floor.
Resolution 2467 B (XXIII). 3 INT'L LAw. 676 (1969).
30. See Mercury in the Environment, supra note 1, at 43-44.
31. One such chemical is nitrilotriacetic acid (NTA), once hailed as a biodegrad-
able substitute for phosphate builders in detergents. See Toxic SUBSTANCES, supra
note 12, at 13. Pressure from the United States Government prompted a temporary
withdrawal of the chemical from the market. Washington Post, December 19, 1970,
at A-I, col 4. Pressure from phosphate foes has led to a limited reinstitution of NTA.
32. Toxic SUBSTANCES, supra note 12, at 20.
33. ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 2, at 11. However, a natural food product
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already been called to the fact that oil is a relatively biodegradable pollu-
tant.3 4 Pesticides present problems much more similar to that of mercury.
For example, the chlorinated hydrocarbons exemplified by DDT, like
mercury, have permeated the marine environment, concentrated in the
food chains, and are now found in almost all living tissue. What has
provoked alarm about pesticides is the dual threat they pose. Not only
are they slowly excreted by the body,35 they also persist in the environ-
ment for decades. The Council on Environmental Quality noted that
".. . present information indicates that DDT can remain toxic for at
least 20 years," then added significantly, "[p]esticides based on toxic,
inorganic elements such as mercury, lead, and arsenic are virtually
permanent."36 Mercury may change back and forth between the toxic,
organic methylmercury and the less toxic inorganic compounds and
free metal, but it never degrades into a totally harmless form.37 In addi-
tion, regarding the mercury already in our waterways, it was observed
that:3 8
Decontamination through natural processes is extremely slow and, consider-
ing the large volumes of mercury contained in some bottom sediments, it
is quite conceivable that some waters will remain contaminated for 100 years
or more.
Neither oil nor DDT can make this claim.
D. The Measure of the Benefits to Society Compared to the Cost of
Taking Action
Application of this fourth criterion is difficult for any form of pollu-
tion. The danger of contaminating marine food supplies for centuries
to come does not lend itself to a cost-benefit analysis. However, a
has been developed which, if eaten together with contaminated fish, can help eliminate
mercury from the human system. Interview with Dr. Andr Danesh, January 6, 1972,
Boston, Mass.
34. See note 15 supra. It must be remembered, though, that the threat of oil pol-
lution to delicate Arctic regions is much more critical.
35. By way of comparison: "The slow rate of elimination of methylmercury ...
has been demonstrated in both fish and man ..... ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH,
supra note 2, at 5.
36. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 13, at 132.
37. "A characteristic feature of heavy metal pollution is its persistence in time
as well as in space for years after the pollutional operations have ceased." WATER
QUALIr CRITERIA, supra note 12, at 84.
38. ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 2, at 26.
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promising feature of mercury pollution is that it is a valuable waste
which can often be economically recovered.39 "[A] variety of byproduct
recovery schemes have made it possible for many industries to trim
mercury losses from hundreds of pounds per day to 1 pound per day
or less."'40
Even where mercury can not be economically recovered, it is frequently
linked to another form of pollution in such a way that a marginal cost
increase could eliminate both. An example is the exhaust emissions
from the combustion of fossil fuels. 41 Consider also the bacteria situa-
tion where eliminating the first-stage problem, the nutrients, would
undoubtedly moderate the second-stage problem, the bacterial conversion
of the inert compounds to methylmercury. Little more than a slight cost
increase could eliminate many of these principal sources of mercury
pollution and spare the world its crippling effects.
III
TOWARD A SOLUTION
Despite its belated concern over mercury pollution, the United States
has made great progress. Disappointingly, these efforts have been largely
confined to the United States.4 2 While calling for an international agree-
ment on marine pollution, the United States has eschewed approaches
of broad scope and consequence that could lead to such an agreement.
An isolationist policy can no more protect the United States from pollu-
tion than it did from two world wars. With these considerations in
mind, the following measures are proposed:
39. Toxic SUBSTANCES, supra note 12, at 17.
40. Mercury in the Environment, supra note 1, at 4. At current market prices,
recovery of mercury wastes could save United States industries alone over 100 million
dollars a year.
41. "In the future we may have to look to fuels with low concentrations of highly
toxic metals just as we look to low-sulfur fuels today." Toxic SUBSTANCES, supra
note 12, at 16.
42. Existing legal controls include: The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k; the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 466 et seq.; the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq.; the Solid Waste
Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251-59; the Resource Recovery Act, 84 Stat. 1227 (1970) ;
and the Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 126-173. See Toxic SuasrANcEs, supra
note 12, at 17-22. However, "[lt is clear that current laws are inadequate to control
the actual and potential dangers of toxic substances comprehensively or systematical-
ly." Id. at 20.
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A. Enactment of Effluent Standards
Of four primary approaches to water pollution,43 only a system of
effluent standards can eliminate heavy metal pollution. The widely used
"'stream standards" approach, which focuses on the total quantity of a
pollutant in a stream and not on the amount coming from a specific
source, is simply unable to cope with a pollutant present in trace amounts
and which may be precipitated, chemically complexed, organically as-
similated, or otherwise removed from the stream water (but not the
active environment) before detection is possible. Yet, yielding to indus-
try pressure, Congress has rejected "effluent standards." 44 The United
States has so far been able to combat mercury pollution only by constru-
ing the Refuse Act45 so as to impose de facto effluent standards on the
de jure stream standards. This much-criticized procedure46 has achieved
only piecemeal success at home and can not be influential abroad.47
43. The four approaches are: 1) stream standards-a "safe" pollution level for
each stream and each pollutant is pre-established with contributors divying up the
allotments like spoils of war; 2) effluent standards-a realistic maximum concen-
tration for each pollutant in an industrial discharge is set, according to available
technology; 3) subsidies approach-no minimums or maximums but offers by the
government to share the costs of pollution control are expected to encourage moral
and social consciousness; 4) effluent charges-a pollution tax which promotes demand
for talented economists able to compute the pollution level that maximizes profits.
See Haskins, Towards Better Administration of Water Quality Control, 49 ORE. L.
REv. 373, 376-392 (1970). Though the federal government has focused on stream
standards, individual states and foreign countries use various combinations of all
four.
44. The Federal Water Quality Control Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 903, originated with
a bill by Senator Muskie calling for dual effluent and stream standards. See S. 649,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 4 (1963). The effluent standards were deleted from the
final act and, also, from more recent amendments.
45. Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3, 1899, sec. 13, now 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970):
That it shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer,
or procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any
* .. manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of
any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and
sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water of
the United States ....
46. The Refuse Act Permit Program, authorized by Exec. Ord. No. 11574, 35 Fed.
Reg. 19627 (1970), has never received explicit Congressional support. Clearly the
Refuse Act was not intended for pollution control except as might jeopardize naviga-
tion, and at least one lawsuit now pending seeks to invalidate the permit scheme.
See ENVIRONMENT REPORTER, CURRENT DEvs.LoPMENTs at 303 (July 1971).
47. The United States is a model for many countries. Any action it takes or fails
to take is mirrored in others, and the effect is magnified by the concept of "reciprocity"
which pervades international law. Some of the consequences of "reciprocity doctrine"
are discussed at note 63 infra and in section III (E) of the text.
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Preliminary to encouraging others to adopt effluent standards is ob-
taining a Congressional stamp of approval in the United States.48
B. Establishment of a Technological Review Board
Since only the most radical ecologists seriously espouse a return to a
Stone Age standard of living, the key to fighting pollution, especially
mercury pollution, is development of new techniques, machines, and
materials to safely replace the offending ones. Thus, in preface to his
compilation of mercury pollution controls, H. R. Jones notes that "[t]he
patent literature is a prime source of basic commercially utilizable in-
formation."4 9 But the patent system has failed to live up to its poten-
tial. First, patent literature may not be, per se, "utilizable." The inherent
vice of the patent system is the grant of a legal monopoly excluding com-
petitors for seventeen years.50 Through corporate-financed research and
the device of exclusive licensing,5' a corporation is able and often finds
it advantageous to monopolize an important discovery. 52 The question
is, can the environment afford to wait seventeen years for the invention
to be fully implemented?5 8
48. Plans are once again afoot in Congress to pass effluent water standards com-
parable to the emission standards of the Clean Air Act of 1970, supra note 24. This
time favorable action seems likely. The Senate Public Works Committee has ap-
proved an appropriate amendment to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq. CONGRESSIONAL RECoRD at D 1046 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1971).
49. MERCURY POLLUTIoN CONTROL, supra note 7, at iii.
50. The Congress shall have Power . . .To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries ....
United States Constitution, Art. I, § 8 (8). The term of the patent grant is set by 35
U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
51. Exclusive domestic patent licensing is sanctioned by 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
52. A recent example of such abuse concerns enzyme detergents. In simple mixtures,
the fine enzyme powder settled on skin and clothes when the detergent was being
poured and caused rashes and other allergic reactions. Then a major detergent manu-
facturer obtained a patent on a process which safely bound enzyme particles to the
heavier detergent granules. Competitors continued to use the troublesome blends. In
a surprising move only six months later, the corporation dedicated to the public the
remaining term of this valuable patent. See 876 O.G. PAT. OFF. 595 (1970). Presum-
ably, the health hazard prompted FTC officials to intercede under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), and the detergent maker chose not to litigate
and risk further loss of public face after the phosphate controversy.
In appropriate cases, a federal court may order compulsory or even royalty-free
licensing (or its equivalent by refusing patent enforcement) premised on antitrust
violations. See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947). More
often, in the environmental context, patent misuse goes unnoticed and unremedied.
53. In theory, availability of a patent disclosure leads others to improvements over
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* Even when technology is available, vested interests may stymie the
development and implementation of anti-pollution devices. For ex-
ample, in 1969, the Department of Justice instituted proceedings against
every major United States automobile manufacturer charging conspiracy
extending over a decade to delay development of pollution control de
vices in violation of antitrust laws. 54 Later that year, the Department
agreed to a settlement based on a consent decree that the manufacturers
would refrain from obstructing the development of anti-pollution de-
vices and would grant royalty-free patent licenses to all companies seek-
ing to use any relevant discoveries.55 Nevertheless, United States auto
manufacturers continue to balk at meeting the 1975 clean air standards
although some Japanese auto makers expect to produce pollution-free
cars for 1972.56
A further abuse of the patent system is the routine granting of patents
for inventions potentially threatening to the environment, possibly con-
trary to existing law.57
One solution to this type of problem would be the creation of a Tech-
nological Review Board, perhaps under the auspices of the existing
Council on Environmental Quality, to review patent applications for
their potential environmental impact. The Board could enter a "Sugges-
tion of Non-patentability," subject to. challenge, for those discoveries
posing a serious environmental threat,58 and make "Special" those ap-
the original discovery. However, a license to the original patent may well be a pre-
requisite to exploiting any improvement since a patent grants the inventor only the
right to exclude others and not necessarily the right to use it himself. 35 U.S.C. §
154 (1970).
54. N. Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
55. N. Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1969, at 1, col. 2. The district judge's approval of the
consent decree raised protests from a score of cities, states, and individuals including
forty-six members of Congress. N. Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1969, at 28, col. 1.
56. N. Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1970, at 70, col. 5.
57. Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manu-
facture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor. . . . (emphasis added.)
85 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). "Useful" in this context was early construed by Judge Story
to exclude inventions which are "... frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good
policy, or sound morals of society . .. For instance, a new invention to poison people
• .. is not a patentable invention." Lowell v. Lewis, 15 Fed. Cas. 1018, 1019 (Fed.
Cas. No. 8568) (Cir. Ct., D. Mass., 1817). Sec. 102(2) (c) of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), reinforces the argument that
the Patent Office is already obliged to consider the environmental effects before
granting a patent.
58. Although refusal of a patent would not foreclose the use of a detrimental in-
vention, lack of protection from competitors might discourage extensive investment
to implement the invention and eventually discourage research on inventions which
could not gain patent protection.
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plications potentially beneficial to the environment.5" Whenever such
an application matured into a patent, the Board would again review
it to determine if the discovery were of such environmental importance
as to warrant assurance that it be generally available. If so, the Board
would have power to take the necessary steps.60
The recent signing of an International Patent Cooperation Treaty,61
establishing unitary processing for all applications submitted under the
program, opens the door to eventual world-wide application of these
procedures.
C. Legitimation of AID Efforts to Control Pollution in Host Countries
The United States, through its foreign aid program, is one of a few
nations able to exert substantial influence on developing countries to
observe pollution controls. Congress has never sanctioned such interfer-
ence with internal state affairs; however, under guise of authority from
59. Present Patent Office procedure leaves it to an applicant's discretion to request
priority processing for his application based on allegations of environmental im-
portance. See 871 O.G. PAT. OFF. 673 (1969).
60. Current patent laws suggest, by analogy, two approaches to insuring availability
and implementation of specially designated inventions. Congress could authorize the
Board to impose compulsory licensing at a reasonable royalty. Cf. United States v.
National Lead Co., supra note 52. Congress has already adopted similar measures in
the field of air pollution. See 1970 Clean Air Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (h) (6).
However, this provision has been criticized as representing the worst of three altera-
tives. See Schwartz, Mandatory Patent Licensing of Air Pollution Control Technology,
57 VA. L. Rzv. 719, 743 (1971).
Alternatively, the Government could preempt patent rights for just compensation
and dedicate the remaining patent term to the public, 35 U.S.C. § 253 (1970). Sug-
gestive of the latter course are 35 U.S.C. §§ 181, 183, which provide for inspection of
applications and appropriation by the Government of patents deemed relevant to
the national security. A solution along these lines has also been criticized, but with
the acknowledgment that: "The primary strength of this system lies in the fact that
it permits maximum utilization of existing technology." Schwartz, supra, at 743.
It is not believed that these procedures would promote surreptitious behavior on
behalf of inventors. The court in Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 224
(1971), said:
We think it rather fanciful to assume that [where the inventor believes he
has a validly patentable invention] there will be substantial withholding of
patent applications in favor of trade secret agreements. A licensee will not
pay as much . . . the secret may leak ... [t]he inventor will forfeit his rights
to ever get a patent.
See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Black in Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
Black believed that federal patent law preempted the field rendering private trade
secret agreements unenforceable under state law.
61. International Patent Cooperation Treaty, signed at Washington, D.C., June 19,
1970. See 876 O.G. PAT. OFF. 374 (1970).
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the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,62 the Agency for Inter-
national Development (AID), charged with administering United States'
foreign aid, has, on its own, undertaken investigations into the environ-
mental impact of projects and conditioned assistance on satisfactory
compliance.6 Although these measures have not been directly attacked
at home, Assistant Secretary of State Christian R. Herter, Jr., has at
least raised doubts as to the propriety if not the legitimacy of some of
AID's actions.64 Herter seems to see a narrow role for AID in internal
environmental affairs, with the agency limited to proffering advice on po-
tential dangers and education on how to avoid them, leaving to the h ost
State the ultimate decision of whether to heed these exhortations.65 This
62. The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible
... (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall . .. (E) recognize the
worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems and, where
consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate sup-
port to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize inter-
national cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of
mankind's world environment ....
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
63. These activities have encompassed plans for the Aswan Dam in Egypt, pesti-
cide distribution in Pakistan, and construction of a steel mill in Turkey. In Pakistan,
the receipt of pesticides was conditioned on distribution only by qualified and
licensed personnel. The first steel mill to be built in Turkey was situated on a hill
and, due to prevailing winds, threatened to spew noxious fumes and soot on a
pleasant coastal village below. Only after considerable bickering was AID able to
persuade the Turkish government to build the four hundred-fifty foot smoke stack
considered necessary to insure that the fumes were carried elsewhere. It is notable
that one of Turkey's principal arguments was that such standards had been exacted
of no steel mill in the United States-one example of the "reciprocity doctrine"
hindering United States efforts abroad. Interview with Harry R. Sachse, formerly
attorney with AID, August 5, 1971, Washington, D.C.
64. 2. The operating procedures established by section 102 of the National En-
vironmental Policy Act (P.L. 91-190) will be applicable to very few actions
of State and AID because the actions affecting the environment in which
our agencies participate, directly or indirectly, almost always occur within
the territorial jurisdiction of some other State. As set forth in the attached
Legal Memorandum, we do not interpret these procedures as applying to
such actions.
Department of State Memorandum from Christian A. Herter, Jr., to Russell Train,
Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality, May 4, 1970. [1971 Transfer Binder]
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER, STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS 46039-46041.
65. 3. The Role of AID
- .. AJID has two primary types of responsibilities in this regard:
To assist in strengthening the indigenous capabilities of the host country
to evaluate the impact of the physical and biological environment of po-
tential development projects, and the consequences of attendant ecological
changes; and
To insure that the environmental consequences of proposed projects are
carefully considered by AID and the host country prior to decisions on carry-
ing out the project.
Id. at 46040.
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can only undermine AID's effectiveness in bargaining with already
reluctant host countries. So important an exercise of United States
paternalism should not hang by so slender a thread. Some administra-
tive guidelines might be desirable to protect against overzealous demands
on foreign countries, but the authority of AID to refuse funding to
projects harmful to the environment should be affirmed by appropriate
amendment of the National Environmental Policy Act06 and the Foreign
Assistance Act.
This philosophy should not be limited to a national agency such as
AID. For some time there have been proposals for replacing AID with
a jointly administered international organization to help share the bur-
dens of foreign assistance.67 In fact, a major part of President Nixon's
program for establishing a regime for the deep sea bed is to set aside
a part of the profits from the mining of deep sea resources for assistance
to under-developed countries as an inducement for their cooperation
in the plan.6 8 A sudden and uncontrolled influx of funds to countries
anxious to improve their living standards could bring about the opposite
result. A foreign aid organization, whether national or international,
must be able to scrutinize every project it finances.
D. Enforcement of Controls Over Domestic Corporations Abroad
Ever-expanding United States' foreign investment can become another
handhold by which American environmental policy is given transnational
effect. In particular, domestic corporations doing business abroad are
vulnerable to regulation. Why, for instance, should the Canadian branch
of a United States chemical company be able to dump mercury wastes
into Lake Erie while its plant just across the lake in Ohio is under a
federal court injunction? Similarly, should a corporate division in France
have more leeway to pollute the Atlantic than does the principal office
in New Jersey? These questions are deceptively simple since the exercise
66. Questions and criticism have come from many corners regarding the scope of
NEPA. On October 7-8, 1971, in an address before the National Institute on the
Law of the Environment, Harry H. Voight, assistant to the chairman of the Federal
Power Commission, observed that NEPA ". . . is woefully ambiguous as it relates
to the work of independent regulatory agencies . . ." and should be revised.
2 ENVIRONMENT REPORTER, CURRENT DEVELOPIENTS 695 (October 1971).
67. See, e.g., Editorial, N. Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1971, at 40, col. 2.
68. See U.S. Ocean Policy, Statement by President Nixon, May 23, 1970, ENVIRON-
MENT REPORTER, FEDERAL LAws 21:0251.
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of "jurisdiction" in international law raises many perplexing problems.
"Adjudicatory jurisdiction" would pose no problems,69 but in addition
the home corporation would have to be brought within one of the
five bases of "legislative jurisdiction" recognized in international law.7 0
For a corporate division merely doing business in a foreign country,
sanctions for violations of United States pollution laws which are ac-
corded transnational effect71 would be clearly sustainable under the
nationality principle.7 2
More intriguing is the question of the foreign subsidiary wholly owned
and controlled by a domestic parent corporation. Absent some type of
fraud, American courts have characteristically refused to pierce the
"corporate veil" of a subsidiary and look to the true corporate identity,73
an act preliminary to finding American nationality and attaching juris-
diction on the nationality principle. This would relegate the courts to
69. "Adjudicatory jurisdiction" in international law is analogous to traditional
notions of in personam and in rem jurisdiction in domestic law, and its exercise
usually depends on finding the individual or his property within the country's
territorial limits. See H. STEINa and D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 642
(1968). This would be easy enough, of course, for a domestic corporation which is
considered to be domiciled in the state of incorporation.
70. The five bases are: 1) the territorial principle; 2) the nationality principle;
3) the protective principle; 4) the universality principle; and 5) the passive per-
sonality principle. See Harvard Research on International Law, Jurisdiction With
Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 445 (Supp. II 1935>. As contrasted with
"adjudicatory jurisdiction", "legislative jurisdiction" delimits the extent to which
municipal law can be held to govern the acts of an individual.
71. Independent of any questions of jurisdiction is the problem that not all
municipal laws will be accorded transnational effect. Absent an express Congressional
intent to extend United States' anti-pollution laws extra-territorially, their applica-
tion to foreign subsidiaries would require a judicial finding that these laws are
among those for which " . . Congress has not thought it necessary to make specific
provision in the law that the locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries,
but allows it to be inferred from the nature of the offense." United States v. Bow-
man, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922). The defendants in Bowman were convicted of con-
spiracy to defraud a corporation in which the United States was a stockholder, a far
cry from violating a more logically territorial pollution law.
72. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). The defendant was ad-
judged guilty of contempt of court when he failed to respond to a subpoena served
on him in France. In affirming, Chief Justice Hughes emphasized the degree of con-
trol a country retains over its nationals abroad. This has been strikingly demon-
strated recently by the various economic controls enacted by Congress over American-
owned foreign corporations in the fields of antitrust, income tax, foreign investment,
and exports. See, e.g., H. STEINER and D. VAGTS, supra note 69, at 1000-1006, for a
discussion of the effects of the 1962 Internal Revenue Act on controlled foreign
corporations. See also Regulations pursuant to the Foreign Direct Investment Act,
15 C.F.R. §§ 1000.201, 1000.503, and 1000.504, and the Trading With The Enemy
Act, 31 C.F.R. § 500.329-"Person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."
73. Illustrative of this point is the case of Behn Meyer & Co. v. Miller, 266 U.S.
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attaching jurisdiction on the basis of either the protective or the passive
personality principles, both less generally accepted than the nationality
principle.7 4 Legislative jurisdiction in either case would turn on proof
of some direct and substantial injury to the United States or its citi-
zens, which might be possible in the case of the Canadian subsidiary
polluting Lake Erie, but nearly impossible for the French subsidiary
polluting the Atlantic. 75
The problem is compounded when the foreign subsidiary is not
wholly owned by the domestic corporation, although this fact alone may
not precude an American court from finding United States nationality
for the subsidiary if there is sufficient control by the domestic corpora-
tion.7 6 A further stumbling block will be finding a way to monitor the
457 (1925), where the Supreme Court maintained that the place of incorporation
determines the nationality of the corporation despite the fact that in this case all of
the shareholders were enemy aliens. The doctrine, in this narrow category of cases,
was expressly reversed by act of Congress during World War II. Trading With The
Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1, as amended by the First War Powers Act of 1941, 55
Stat. 839. See generally Kronstein, The Nationality of International Enterprises, 52
COLUm. L. Rav. 983 (1953). Civil law countries, on the other hand, give more weight
to the head office or seat of business, e.g. the French siege social, than to place of
incorporation. See H. SaINR and D. VAars, supra note 69, at 61-62, for a discussion
of the various factors courts have given weight in determining corporate nationality.
It should be noted, however, that nationality is usually decided in the context of
choice-of-law problems, and the same considerations will not necessarily control
jurisdictional questions.
74. See Harvard Research, supra note 70. But cf. Case of the S.S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J.,
Ser. A, No. 10 (1927). In this famous case, the Permanent Court of International
Justice upheld the right of a Turkish court to try and convict of involuntary man-
slaughter a French national, the officer of watch aboard the "Lotus," following a
collision with a Turkish collier on the high seas off the coast of Turkey in which
eight Turkish nationals lost their lives.
75. As the principle of the interdependence of nations in protecting the Earth's
ecology gains acceptance, the more persuasive will become the exercise of jurisdiction
in pollution cases founded on the protective and passive personality principles.
76. See, e.g., Socit6 Remington Typewriter v. Kahn, 1936 Dalloz Juris. I 121 (Cour
de Cassation, France, May 12, 1931> as cited in H. STEINER and D. VAGTS, supra note
69, at 65. Abandoning the customary rule of law, the court held that although the
subsidiary was incorporated in France with its siage social in Paris, the controlling
factors in determining nationality were that 16/l8ths of its capital contributions were
by "the great American company of the same name" and that the board of directors
was composed exclusively of Americans. In the United States, the Treasury Depart-
ment, at least, has not been as rigid as the courts in determining corporate nationality
and has taken the view that as little as 40% ownership by a United States corporation
can be sufficient "control" of a foreign company to bring it within the regulations
promulgated under authority of the Trading With The Enemy Act. See Berman and
Garson, United States Export Controls-Past, Present, and Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
791, 871 (1967). For example, in a widely-publicized case in 1957, the Treasury De-
partment demanded that Ford Motors require its Canadian subsidiary to repudiate a
contract with Communist China which called for exports from Canada contrary to
American laws. Id. at 868. See also Haight, United States Controls Over Strategic
Transactions, 1965 U. Iu.. L. F. 337.
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foreign industries, and cooperation with the foreign state will probably
be necessary. Clearly this will not be an easy program to make opera-
tional, but as American industry continues to expand into developing
countries eager for prosperity, even with the attendant pollution costs,T7
a way to restrain the harmful effects will become increasingly important
to the world environment.
E. Reconsideration of the Connally Reservation
With increased attention being given to international approaches to
pollution, now is an appropriate time to step back and consider to what
extent the United States will be able to enforce any international stand-
ards that may emerge from the current activity.78 The widely-criticized
"Connally Reservation" to the United States Declaration 79 under Article
86 (2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice80 has already
cost the United States valuable foreign claims and may likewise cost
77. Developing countries " .. would like to first enjoy the benefits of industrializa-
tion and technology before they begin to control its deleterious aspects." Krueger,
International and National Regulation of Pollution from Offshore Oil Pollution, 7
SAN DIEGo L. Rav. 541, 553 (1970).
78. Several conventions relating to oil pollution of the high seas already exist. Id.
The United States has prepared a Draft Convention on Ocean Dumping. Infra,
note 102. In June, 1972, a worldwide conference on human environment will be con-
vened in Stockholm, Sweden; and, the United Nations has called a new conference
on the law of the sea for 1973. Infra, note 99.
79. ... the United States of America recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and
without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same
obligation, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in all legal
disputes hereafter arising concerning treaties and questions of international
law Provided, that this declaration shall not apply to . .. (b) disputes with
regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
United States of America as determined by the United States of America ....
[1965-1966] I.C.J.Y.B. 67 (emphasis added). The Connally Reservation was clearly
intended to give the United States the prerogative to retain control of a case when
it was in its best interests to do so. However, the reservation of self-determination of
jurisdiction is considered one of the two most serious affronts to the power of the
Court. See I. SHIHATA, THE POWER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT TO DETERMINE ITS
OWN JURIsDIcTON (1964> at 154. In 1964, of 147 countries that had made Declarations
under Article 36(2) of the I.C.J. Statute, only Liberia, Mexico, the Sudan, the
Republic of South Africa, and the United States retained the self-determination
reservation. Id. at 382, Appendix VII, No. 6 (B).
80. 59 Stat. 1055 (1945), T. S. No. 993, as amended, 16 U.S.T. 1134, T.I.A.S. No. 5857.
Article 36 (2) reads:
The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in rela-
tion to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the
Court in all legal disputes concerning [treaties and questions of international
law].
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the United States the chance to ever play a major role in enforcing in-
ternational pollution standards before the World Court.8'
The reservation of matters within a country's "domestic jurisdiction"
in an Article 36 (2) Declaration is not unusual-the United Nations
Charter excludes such matters from the Court's jurisdiction even absent
an express reservation82 -but the further reservation by the United
States of the right to make its own determination of what constitutes
"domestic jurisdiction" directly contravenes Article 36 (6) of the I.C.J.
Statute which reserves to the Court the right to determine its own juris-
diction.83 Among the judges of the Court, four philosophies are discern-
ible regarding the effect of such a conflict.8 4 The "absolutist" or "strict
consent" approach espoused by Judge Lauterpacht in the Norwegian
Loans case8 5 would strike the Declaration as a total nullity. A less con-
sent-oriented school of thought would strike only that portion of the
Declaration which raised the conflict, namely, the self-determination
clause.8 6 A third approach is to hold the country which made the Declara-
tion to a standard of good faith in determining "domestic jurisdiction."
81. Of course, an Article 36 (2) Declaration is not the only way to invoke the
I.C.J.'s contentious jurisdiction. Ad hoc jurisdiction may be conferred on the Court
under Article 56 (1> by means of a compromis or special agreement of the parties.
See SHIHATA, supra note 79, at 127. However, a polluting country clearly in the
wrong would not be expected to consent to such an agreement. Another means of
creating continued jurisdiction of the Court is the use of a "compromissary clause"
in treaties and conventions, also provided for in Article 36 (1). See also Articles 55 (2)
and 57. In the past, these agreements to submit all disputes involving the treaties
to compulsory I.C.J. resolution have been almost as important as mutual Declarations
as a source of jurisdiction. SHIHATA, supra note 79, at 309, Appendix I. A recent de-
velopment in treaties and conventions is the increasing use of an optional protocol
with respect to compulsory LCJ. jurisdiction to encourage more signatures and rati-
fications of the principal document. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA (1958), containing the four 1958 Geneva Conventions and an optional
protocol. In addition, the United States has attempted to attach Connally-type reser-
vations to the compromissary clauses in some treaties. See Bishop & Myers, Unwar-
ranted Extension of Connally-Amendment Thinking, 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 135 (1961).
The usefulness of compromissary clauses as an alternate basis for I.C.J. jurisdiction
is, therefore, severely limited.
82. See Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945), T. S. No.
995.
85. "In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter
shall be settled by the decision of the Court." Statute of the I.C.J., Article 36(6).
84. See SHIHATA, supra note 79, at 284-294.
85. See Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 9, for the separate
opinion of Judge Lauterpacht.
86. "This Declaration consists of two parts, acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction
and reservations to that acceptance. Those two elements of a single judicial act are
separable. Nothing justifies us, when reading the text, in considering them as an
indivisible whole." Dissenting opinion of Judge Armand-Ugon in the Interhandel
Case, 1959 I.C.J. REP. 6, 91.
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The fourth view, which implicitly received majority support from the
Court in the Norwegian Loans case, is to accept the Declaration on its
face, but subject to the condition of Article 36 (2) "reciprocity"8 7 on the
part of other countries.88 Even if the fourth and most liberal approach
continues to command a majority of the Court, in any action by the
United States before the I.C.J. to enforce pollution standards against an-
other country based on mutual Article 36 (2) Declarations, the country
charged could invoke "domestic jurisdiction" based on the United States'
Declaration to strip the Court of jurisdiction, no matter how arbitrary
the determination was.
The most seriously considered reform proposal to date has been
amending the Connally Reservation to the effect that United States
determinations of "domestic jurisdiction" would not be made capricious-
ly or in bad faith.89 For example, in its initial arguments in the Aerial
Incident case,90 the United States contended that a "good faith" de-
termination was implicit in the Connally Reservation; thus, Bulgaria's
reciprocal invocation of the Connally Reservation could not be arbi-
trary. Whether an express amendment of the Connally Reservation would
improve the United States' position in the eyes of other countries and
before the I.C.J. in a Bulgaria-type case is uncertain. What it might not
do is give the United States standing to prosecute many important en-
vironmental issues before the Court, because the decision that territorial
pollution is within domestic jurisdiction will frequently be too border-
line to be called arbitrary. Consider, for instance, three cases where the
United States is the offender:
1. The United States is disposing of toxic nerve gas by dumping can-
nisters into the Gulf Stream outside territorial waters. Great Britain com-
plains that if the cannisters corrode and rupture, the gas may be swept
to the British coast. Here, it would clearly be arbitrary for the United
87. Article 36(2) "reciprocity" derives from the phrase "in relation to any other
state accepting the same obligation." Supra, note 80. This automatically conditions
a Declaration to give the declaring country, as a defense, the benefit of any reserva-
tions in the Declaration of the country bringing the action. This should be dis-
tinguished from the "reciprocity" clause of Article 36(3) by which a country may
condition its Declaration to be ineffective until certain other states have made similar
Declarations.
88. See StmHATA, supra note 79, at 293 n.2.
89. See Schlesinger, The Connally Amendment-Amelioration by Interpretation?, 48
VA. L. REv. 685, 696 (1962).
90. Aerial Incident of July 27, 1955, [1959] I.C.J. Pleadings. The United States
withdrew the "good faith" contention before the Court decided the issue, although it
meant certain loss of a valuable claim.
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States to assert "domestic jurisdiction," and, based on the amended
Connally Reservation, the Court could dismiss the plea and hear this
case on the merits.
2. An Ohio municipality is dumping sewage into an Ohio river which
carries it to Lake Erie causing eutrophication damaging to Canadian
fisheries and recreational areas. The objectionable activity has its situs
in the United States, generally a firm basis for claiming "domestic
jurisdiction," but the causal relation is clear and the injury to Canada is
direct. The doctrine of the Tunis-Morocco case might support a finding
by the Court that this was ". . . a matter which, by international law, is,
in principle, solely within the domestic jurisdiction of one Party, but
[is] of a nature to preclude in the particular case such exclusive juris-
diction."91 This conclusion is buttressed by the dicta of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. that
a similar dispute involving mercury pollution was better suited for
resolution by the International Joint Commission9 2 than a national
court.
9 3
3. A United States corporation in Maine is dumping mercury wastes
into the Penobscot River, which empties into the Atlantic, contaminat-
ing the valuable North Atlantic fisheries shared by Canada, Iceland,
Great Britain, Russia, and others. Yet, the injury here is not so direct nor
the cause so clear. Although the I.C.J. might have held there was no
"domestic jurisdiction" under the Tunis-Morocco doctrine if it were
examining the case de novo, on review of the United States determin-
ation, like a federal court of appeals limited in reviewing questions of
fact, the I.C.J. may not be able to find the "dearly erroneous" de-
cision necessary to overrule the United States. If the United States could
exclude itself from suit in this common type of water pollution offense,
so could others gain immunity from actions by the United States under
the "reciprocity doctrine."
91. Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees, [1923] P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 4.
92. The International Joint Commission was established by the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 between the United States and Canada to resolve disputes regarding
the use of boundary waters and the rights of either state along their common frontier.
36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548. See generally L. BLOOMFIELD and G. FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY
WATER PROBLEMS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (1958).
93. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
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Two recent developments emphasize the need for the United States
to unfetter itself before the World Court, at least with respect to environ-
mental issues. First is the trend toward countries claiming and obtaining
recognition of increasingly broad territorial seas. Despite the lack of a
consensus sufficient to establish an international accord at the 1930
Hague Convention, until the Truman Proclamation of 1945, it was
fairly well agreed that a coastal state was entitled to claim up to three
miles from its low tide mark as territorial seas. 94 The Truman Proclama-
tion was only a statement of United States policy regarding the con-
tinental shelf, and probably then no more than a codification of already
accepted international principles,95 but it triggered an era of increasing-
ly ambitious claims by coastal states to the adjacent ocean. The 1958
Geneva Convention, which produced four major conventions on the
oceans,9 6 proved a hopeless deadlock on the issue of territorial waters.
The United States still argued for three miles. The Soviet Union and
the Arab states opted for twelve, while some Latin American states
asserted exclusive rights to 200 miles of ocean.97 A new convention
especially called in 1960 had no more success than the earlier one.98
Since then, more and more states have abandoned the traditional three
mile rule. A new conference on the law of the sea has been called for
1973. 99 Although it is unlikely that anything so radical as a 200-mile
territorial limit will be agreed upon, the old rule is certainly dead.
With respect to the -environment, this need not be a bad thing. The
South American countries originally justified their 200-mile claim by
the need to protect their valuable fisheries from foreign exploitation,
and Canada premised its establishment of a 100-mile pollution zone in the
Arctic on the preservation of that delicate region from oil pollution.100
94. See Palmer, Territorial Sea Agreement-Key to Progress in the Law of the Sea,
25 JAG J. 69, 70 (1971).95. The Truman Proclamation specifically provided that: "The character as high
seas of the waters above the continental shelf and the right to their free and un-
impeded navigation are in no way thus affected." 59 Stat. 884, 10 Fed. Reg. 12803(1945).
96. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (1958).
97. See Palmer, supra note 94, at 73-74.
98. See Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight for
Freedom of the Seas, 54 Am. J. IN-'L L. 751 (1960).
99. United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 2750 (Dec. 17, 1970.
100. "The stated legal rationale for the Canadian action is uncomfortably reminiscent
of early Latin American justification for 200-mile jurisdictional claims." Palmer,
supra note 94, at 73. For the Canadian Legislation on Arctic Pollution, Territorial
Seas, and Fishing Zones see 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 543-52. For the Canadian Prime Min-
ister's Remarks concerning the legislation see 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 600-04
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However, the potential for unhindered exploitation is always present
when a State claims sovereignty over an area to the exclusion of all
other States' interests. For example, the 1970 Montivideo Declaration,
which formalized the claims of South and Central American countries
to 200 miles of territorial sea, although prefaced to show the desire to
protect newly-claimed areas, contains in its text language sufficiently
ambiguous to sanction offshore pollution by the coastal state. 101 A country
which would never consider dumping toxic wastes three miles from its
shore where the likelihood of it washing back is great, might readily dis-
pose of the same wastes 200 miles away. If the State could successfully
defend a suit by the United States before the I.C.J. on the ground of
"domestic jurisdiction" over an act within its territorial waters, dreams
like an Ocean Dumping Convention may be a long way off.10 2
The second development is the Canadian precedent of amending
its Article 36 (2) Declaration to specifically exclude questions of marine
pollution from I.C.J. jurisdiction.' 0a This is a strange turnabout for a
country which has, without reservation, accepted the compulsory juris-
diction of the World Court since its original Declaration in 1929 before
the Permanent Court of International Justice. It was presumably im-
pelled by the fear of an adverse decision before the I.C.J. on its Arctic
anti-pollution policies. Nevertheless, by virtue of "reciprocity doctrine,"
another major power sympathetic to environmental problems has dis-
abled itself before the Court. It is ironic that, if this precedent is fol-
lowed by others in the name of self-protection, there will be no country
left to bring less-responsible states to account.
101. The States Represented at the Montivideo Meeting on The Law of the
Sea ... Do Declare, as Basic Principles of the Law of the Sea...The
right to explore, conserve and exploit [the living and natural resources of
the waters and continental shelf of the sea adjacent to their territories.]
(emphasis added).
9 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1081-1083 (1970).
102. See United States Draft Convention on Ocean Dumping, 10 INT'L LEGAL MAT.
1021 (Sept. 1971).
103. Section 2(d) of the amended Declaration excludes from compulsory I.C.J.
jurisdiction:
disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or
exercised by Canada in respect of the conservation, management or exploita-
tion of the living resources of the sea, or in respect of the prevention or
control of pollution or contamination of the marine environment in marine
areas adjacent to the coast of Canada.
9 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 598-599 (May 1970). For an analysis see Macdonald, The New
Canadian Declaration of Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, 8 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 3 (1970).
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However, the Canadian precedent may suggest a corrective course of
action for the United States. The United States could amend its Declara-
tion to vest the I.C.J. with authority to determine its own jurisdiction
per Article 36 (6) in cases raising substantial environmental issues not-
withstanding the Connally Reservation. This procedure would raise prob-
lems of what constitutes a "substantial environmental issue" not unlike
the "federal question" problem in the United States' courts.104 How-
ever, this problem might still prove a lesser obstacle than would out-
right repeal of the Connally Reservation.
CONCLUSION
Mercury is a widespread and dangerous pollution problem, but it is not
insoluble. The trouble with mercury pollution is that it can not be
isolated. It presents a problem requiring a concerted effort on the part
of all nations against all forms of pollution. The United States has shown
interest in an international solution to pollution problems, but it should
consider those steps it could take at home to pave the way for such an
agreement. Some of those steps are: A) enactment of effluent standards;
B) establishment of a technological review board; C) legitimation of
AID efforts to control pollution in host countries; D) enforcement of
controls over domestic corporations abroad; and, E) reconsideration of
the Connally Reservation. With mercury pollution, the decisive factor
may not be how soon international accord can be reached, but rather,
what is done in the interim. If the necessary procedures and machinery
could be established in advance by enough countries, with the United
States leading as an example, an international agreement would be little
more than a formality.
David Silverstein
104. See, e.g., Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (19A6).
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